The acquisition of conscience and Developmental Systems Theory

Summary Proponents of Developmental Systems Theory (DST) argue that it offers an alternative to current research programs in biology that are built on the historic disjunction between evolutionary and developmental biology. In this paper I illustrate how DST can be used to account for the acquisition of an important component of moral agency, conscience. Susan Oyama, a major proponent of DST, has set moral issues outside the compass of DST. Thus, I examine her reasons for restricting DST to non-moral matters, and argue that they are not decisive. On the positive side, I argue that DST not only is compatible with attempts to describe and explain moral agency but also aids us in understanding it. In particular, I show how DST can provide a fruitful perspective for viewing some significant current findings and theories in moral developmental psychology about the acquisition of conscience. The familiar dichotomies resisted by DST, those between genes and environment, inherited and acquired, innate and learned, and biological and cultural, have also plagued human developmental psychology, including moral development. By bringing a DST perspective to the study of moral development, I illustrate how a DST perspective might offer a promising way to reconceive that phenomenon, and provide some insights into how further work in understanding the development of moral agency might proceed. Thus, I hope to contribute to the current efforts of proponents of DST to integrate developmental and evolutionary considerations.     

It is better to be ignorant of our moral enhancement: A reply to Zambrano

In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet conditions for permissible liberty-restricting public health interventions. Second, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that covert moral bioenhancement undermines autonomy to a greater degree than does overt moral bioenhancement. In this paper, I rebut both of these arguments, then finish by noting important avenues of research that Zambrano’s arguments motivate.     

On justifying arguments of species membership

In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ argument. On these grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism.     

Managing ethical challenges around misattributed parentage within the clinical context: Insights from an African moral theory

This study argues the thesis that a set of guidelines ‐ firmly rooted in a particular interpretation of African moral theory, specifically, Ubuntu – will do a better job than current medical ethics frameworks, in addressing ethical challenges around misattributed parentage within the clinical context. Incidental information such as information with significant personal/health implications raises unique challenges for medical professionals. For example, withholding information of misattributed paternity accidentally discovered in clinical interactions may be seen by a patient as a violation of his/her right‐to‐know. Contrarily, disclosure where a patient has not requested information – or where establishing paternity is not the purpose of clinical visit/interaction – may be taken by the patient as a violation of his/her right ‘not‐to‐know’. Resolving these challenges remain a herculean task. African moral theory contains an under‐emphasized value for addressing such ethical challenges around misattributed parentage in the field of transplant. I seek to contribute this knowledge; and enhance clinician‐patient relationship. This study builds off three completed systematic reviews, which aimed to answer the following questions: “what are the ethical challenges regarding information health professionals face within the clinical contest?” and “what core aspects (or common themes) of Ubuntu can be identified in existing literature describing the same?” In this present study, I applied the definition of Ubuntu which captures the core aspects of the theory in ethical literature on the same, to address ethical issues around unsought information of misattributed parentage in the field of transplant.     

‘Straightening What’s Crooked’? Recognition as Moral Disruption in Indonesia’s Confucianist Revival

ABSTRACT

In 2006, the Indonesian state re-recognised Confucianism as an official religion, but this did not have the straightforwardly positive consequences that either Confucianist revivalists or some theorists of recognition might have predicted. Revivalists were often – but not always – gripped by feelings of outrage and moral torment, whilst the pace of the revival itself was very uneven. These varied outcomes reflect the complex politics pervading the lives of Indonesian Confucianists (and Chinese Indonesians more generally) as post-Suharto reforms force them to grapple with their diverse histories of accommodation and resistance to the New Order’s discriminatory policies. To fully understand such material, first-person moral perspectives must be incorporated into critical anthropological studies of recognition, as a complement to approaches focused on power and domination. Doing so reveals an important general truth about recognition – its capacity to be morally disruptive – and broadens our understanding of why recognition can hurt those it ostensibly stands to benefit.     

Execution by lethal injection, euthanasia, organ-donation and the proper goals of medicine

In a recent issue of this journal, David Silver and Gerald Dworkin discuss the physicians' role in execution by lethal injection. Dworkin concludes that discussion by stating that, at that point, he is unable to think of an acceptable set of moral principles to support the view that it is illegitimate for physicians to participate in execution by lethal injection that would not rule out certain other plausible moral judgements, namely that euthanasia is under certain conditions legitimate and that organ-donation surgery is sometimes permissible. This article draws attention to some problems in the views of Silver and Dworkin and suggests moral principles which support the three moral views just mentioned.     

Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies

Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual''s welfare given parochial culturally constructed moral systems. If so, then moral condemnation should be more severe when transgressions are recent and local, and should be sensitive to the pronouncements of authority figures (who are often arbiters of moral norms), as the fitness pay-offs of moral disapproval will primarily derive from the ramifications of condemning actions that occur within the immediate social arena. Correspondingly, moral transgressions should be viewed as less objectionable if they occur in other places or times, or if local authorities deem them acceptable. These predictions contrast markedly with those derived from prevailing non-evolutionary perspectives on moral judgement. Both classes of theories predict purportedly species-typical patterns, yet to our knowledge, no study to date has investigated moral judgement across a diverse set of societies, including a range of small-scale communities that differ substantially from large highly urbanized nations. We tested these predictions in five small-scale societies and two large-scale societies, finding substantial evidence of moral parochialism and contextual contingency in adults'' moral judgements. Results reveal an overarching pattern in which moral condemnation reflects a concern with immediate local considerations, a pattern consistent with a variety of evolutionary accounts of moral judgement.     

Ethics of care and HIV: a case for rural women in India

Recent literature shows that ethics of care can be used as a theoretical basis to add a new, important dimension to social issues. This paper argues for a similar extension of the theoretical support from ethics of care to an area in bioethics. Specifically, it contends that a justification based ethics of care can be constructed to argue for a moral obligation to give some priority in the HIV-related initiatives to one of most vulnerable groups; namely, the rural women in India. In an epidemic situation this care-based approach has certain advantages as a moral justification over the usual traditional approaches.     

Rights, indirect harms and the non-identity problem

The non‐identity problem is the problem of grounding moral wrongdoing in cases in which an action affects who will exist in the future. Consider a woman who intentionally conceives while on medication that is harmful for a fetus. If the resulting child is disabled as a result of the medication, what makes the woman's action morally wrong? I argue that an explanation in terms of harmful rights violations fails, and I focus on Peter Markie's recent rights‐based defense. Markie's analysis rests on the notion of an indirect harm, and I show that the calculation of an indirect harm relies on an improper baseline for the determination of whether or not an action adversely affects a patient's interests. I also defend an impersonal duty‐based analysis of the wrongdoing in non‐identity cases against an objection by Markie. I close by arguing that the rights‐based analysis is insensitive to context and that context is morally relevant in the determination of the moral valence of actions in cases of non‐identity. This failure provides a pro tanto reason to favor an impersonal duty‐based analysis of the wrongdoing in non‐identity cases.